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ABSTRACT 
The current (2010) National Security Strategy (NSS) states that: “We will monitor 
China’s military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. 
interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected.” This thesis 
assesses a major element of that goal.  As our president’s NSS points out, an 
understanding of how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operates is critically 
important to the American assessment of its own security posture in Asia.   
In 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld remarked:  “Since no nation 
threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing [military] investment?”  Despite 
assurances from the leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that its military 
modernization program is committed to peace and stability, many outsiders remain 
skeptical of growing Chinese power. However, one way to gain insight into the PRC’s 
intentions is to study its recent history and current strategy. 
History shows that the PRC balances against what it perceives as hegemony by 
seeking assistance from other regional powers and altering its defense strategy to deal 
with major security threats.  Current PLA doctrine and capabilities show that Beijing 
seeks regional dominance through a strategy of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) in 
order to defend the homeland and ensure security interests at home and abroad.  The 
PRC’s former and current defense strategies show that Beijing’s perception of the United 
States as a major security threat is driving PLA modernization efforts and influencing 
America’s security posture in Asia.  This is one of the most important issues facing the 
U.S. military today. 
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The current (2010) National Security Strategy (NSS) states that: “We will monitor 
China’s military modernization program and prepare accordingly to ensure that U.S. 
interests and allies, regionally and globally, are not negatively affected.”1  This thesis 
assesses a major element of that goal.  As our president’s NSS points out, an 
understanding of how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) operates is critically 
important to the American assessment of its own security posture in Asia. 
In 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld remarked:  “Since no nation 
threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing [military] investment?”2  Despite 
assurances from the leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that its military 
modernization program is committed to peace and stability, many outsiders remain 
skeptical of growing Chinese power. However, one way to gain insight into the PRC’s 
intentions is to study its recent history and current strategy. 
History shows that the PRC balances against what it perceives as hegemony by 
seeking assistance from other regional powers and altering its defense strategy to deal 
with major security threats.  Current PLA doctrine and capabilities show that Beijing 
seeks regional dominance through a strategy of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) in 
order to defend the homeland and ensure security interests at home and abroad.  The 
PRC’s former and current defense strategies show that Beijing’s perception of the United 
States as a major security threat is driving PLA modernization efforts and influencing 
America’s security posture in Asia.  This is one of the most important issues facing the 
U.S. military today. 
                                                 
1 President Barak Obama, National Security Strategy (May 2010), 43. 
2 Donald Rumsfeld, speech at the United States Embassy of Singapore 4 June 2005.  
http://singapore.usembassy.gov/060405.html. 
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A. AMERICA’S PERSPECTIVE 
A recent article by Robert Kaplan outlines China’s growing regional ambitions 
and even provides a map of anticipated power projection goals.3  Kaplan’s article 
references John Mearsheimer, who predicts an inevitable military conflict between the 
United States and China.4  Bill Gertz describes China as “the most serious national 
security threat the United States faces at present and will remain so into the foreseeable 
future.”5  Finally, Steven Mosher argues that: “The Communist Party leadership is 
engaged in a long-term struggle with the United States for world hegemony.”6  Concern 
about China is growing in America in large part because of the recent difficulties in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the continuing U.S. recession, and the PRC’s accumulation of U.S. 
national debt.  The apprehension surrounding China is understandable; China is growing 
economically, modernizing militarily, and gaining international significance.  However, 
most Western media naturally tend to promote an alarmist tone when addressing the 
China threat in an attempt to deliver the most interesting and compelling story possible. 
Admittedly, Western media are not always the best source of systematic and 
disinterested analysis.  The best articulation of the “academic” version of the PLA 
modernization debate is provided by Aaron Friedberg and Robert Ross.7  Both authors 
are accomplished professors at well-known universities who agree on many aspects of 
China’s rise, yet they have very different views on China’s military threat.  Friedberg 
views China as a menace that must be simultaneously engaged with and balanced against 
to ensure that America’s regional influence is not degraded.  Ross views the immediacy 
of China’s military threat as a myth and argues that the measures proposed by Friedberg 
are already in progress. 
                                                 
3 Robert Kaplan “The Geography of Chinese Power; How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at 
Sea?”Foreign Affairs (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, May/June 2010), 27. 
4 John Mearshimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History (Apr 2006): 160–162.  
5 Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Threatens America (Washington, D.C., 
Regency, 2000), 199. 
6 Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World  (San Francisco: 
Encounter Books, 2000), VIII. 
7Aaron Friedberg and Robert Ross, “Here Be Dragons,” The National Interest (2009), 19–34. 
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The difference between China’s military threat as a menace or a myth is certainly 
significant, but also subtle.  Most academics agree with Friedberg and Ross that China’s 
economy and military are growing at an impressive pace, but determining Beijing’s 
intentions for the PLA remains highly contested.  Much research has been devoted lately 
to the PLA’s emerging military capabilities, but there is little objective analysis that 
explains the driving forces behind China’s strategic change or current military 
modernization efforts. 
Understanding how the PLA leadership views China’s security situation is critical 
to understanding current modernization efforts.  Dennis Blasko outlines the PLA’s 
history and military philosophy, and also describes its equipment, organization, training, 
and employment.8  David Shambaugh analyzes the evolving civil-military relationships 
and points out gaps between theory and aspirations and actual PLA capabilities.9  Both of 
these authors discuss China’s threat perceptions, which they conclude are derived from a 
tenuous domestic situation, an extensive border area and a complex maritime region that 
is critical to China’s industrial backbone.  They also agree that China’s military has made 
considerable progress in recent decades, but the PLA has a long way to go until it poses a 
serious threat to the United States. 
The forces that cause large-scale change in PLA strategy are important to 
understanding the purpose behind emerging capabilities and doctrine.  Nan Li’s analysis 
shows that in the mid-1980s the PLA leadership redefined China’s security environment 
by determining that a great power war between China and either the Soviet Union or the 
United States was unlikely.10  This allowed the PLA to implement radical new policy 
changes that reduced the size of the PLA and emphasized being prepared to fight “local, 
limited war.” 
                                                 
8 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 1–182. 
9 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004), 1–355. 
10 Nan Li, “Organizational Changes of the PLA, 1985–1997”The China Quarterly (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, Jun 1999), 314–349; for doctrinal development see: Nan Li, “The PLA’s 
Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, 1985–1995: A Chinese Perspective” The China 
Quarterly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 179–199. 
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Paul Godwin explores China’s strategy and doctrine as a way of understanding 
China’s security concerns and concludes that the PLA will emphasize the high-
technology of information warfare and anti-satellite capability to mitigate the American 
capabilities demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm.11  This analysis is important 
because it picks up where Li’s left off and is one of the first to address the PLA’s shift 
into its current strategy of being prepared to fight “local, limited war under conditions of 
informatization”. 
Thomas Christiansen also offers an early assessment of China’s then emerging 
strategy of countering U.S. high-technology with relatively low-technology weapons.12  
Unlike many popular Western publications or authors, Christiansen rejects the notion of 
China as an emerging superpower or peer competitor with the United States, but he does 
point out that the PLA can pose problems to the U.S. military without reaching parity in 
any category. 
Determining how China prioritizes its force procurement and what capabilities it 
needs to develop can indicate how the PLA intends to implement state power abroad.  
David Shambaugh concludes that China’s military power projection capabilities will 
steadily improve but not to the extent that America’s regional interests will necessarily be 
threatened.13  This was reaffirmed by Admiral Dennis Blair, who also pointed out that 
ambiguous intentions were a major obstacle to creating security communities in East 
Asia.14  As the former commander-in-chief of U.S. Pacific Forces, Admiral Blair’s 
remarks deserve special attention. 
                                                 
11 Paul Godwin, conference draft for The PLA and Chinese Society in Transition (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University, 2001). 
12 Thomas Christiansen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up; China’s Rise and Challenges for 
U.S. Security Policy” International Security (2001), 5–40. 
13 Shambaugh, “China’s Military Modernization:  Making Steady and Surprising Progress” Strategic 
Asia 2005-2006 (2006), 67–103. 
14 Dennis Blair, John Handley, “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstruction Asia-Pacific Security 
Arrangements” The Washington Quarterly (2001), 7–9. 
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However, as Timperlake and Triplett point out, Admiral Blair also said “Taiwan 
is the turd in the punchbowl of U.S.-China relations.”15  Their point was that while 
China’s power projection goals are limited, they pose an increasing and imminent threat 
to Taiwan and America’s regional influence by extension.  Michael O’Hanlon and 
Richard Bush disagree and argue that the PLA do not possess the necessary forces to 
establish air superiority, conduct an amphibious landing, or reinforce its initial foothold 
on Taiwan.16  Analyzing the type and scope of military capabilities on both sides of the 
Taiwan Straits can help to determine the intentions of the PLA modernization efforts. 
B. CHINA’S PERSPECTIVE 
Despite China’s abysmal history of open political discourse in academia, many 
Chinese scholars have recently published a wide range of opinions concerning the future 
of China’s security environment.  Li Jijun, the deputy commandant of China’s Academy 
of Military Sciences, points out that “globalization is not Westernization”17  This 
observation is an important starting point for understanding the an emerging nationalistic 
attitude toward the U.S. that is shared by many Chinese authors. 
Written in 1996, China Can Say No was a popular book that expressed Chinese 
nationalism and opposed Western domination of Chinese affairs.18  Written among a 
backdrop of rising Chinese economic strength, the third Taiwan Straits Crisis, and U.S. 
opposition to WTO membership, the contributors struck a chord with many Chinese 
citizens.  However, the 2009 sequel, Unhappy China, lacked the success of its 
predecessor, implying that the title may not accurately convey the sentiment of the people 
                                                 
15 Edward Timperlake and William Triplett, Red Dragon Rising; Communist China’s Military Threat 
to America (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc., 1999).  Admiral Blair’s quote is found on 151. 
16Richard Bush and Michael O’Hanlon, A War Like No Other; The Truth about China’s Challenge to 
America(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2007), 187–195. 
17 Li Jijun, “Need To Bolster Traditional, Non-traditional Security,” Bejing Liaowang [Beijing 
Magazine] (Beijing: Xinhua News Agency, 2004), 7. 
18Song Qiang, et al., Zhongguo keyi shuo bu—Lengzhanhou shidai de zhengzhi yu qinggan jueze 
[China Can Say No—the Political and Emotional Choice in the post-Cold War era], (Beijing: Zhonghua 
Nonggongshang Lianhe Press, 1996), 25–28, 50, 230. 
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after all.19  While the intensity and target of Chinese national pride can be debated, the 
sheer size of China’s population, a growing tendency to demonstrate publicly, and the 
CCP’s preoccupation with ensuring social stability all highlight the potential magnitude 
of China’s nationalism. 
PLA Colonels Huang Xing and Zuo Quandian state that “our enemy’s high-tech 
weapons and equipment are not flawless, but have some weaknesses and 
shortcomings.”20  This is alarming not only because two PLA officers clearly describe 
the United States as an enemy, but also because they apparently validate the findings of 
Shambaugh, Blasko, Blair, and Christensen by describing a strategy of countering U.S. 
technology with low-tech weapons that are good enough to do so. 
Gu Guoliang from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences advocates for the 
simultaneous expansion of PLA nuclear forces and diplomatic efforts to limit other 
countries from acquiring nuclear weapons or material.  This recommendation was 
reached by an analysis of recent (2002) shifts in U.S. policy and intends to “stop the U.S. 
trend of unilateralism, and to establish a fair and just international arms control 
mechanism with unified standards within the framework of the United Nations.”21  
While the initial emphasis is on countering U.S. capability, the subtle shift to other means 
of employing national power is significant.  In China, the concept of comprehensive 
national power includes not only military prowess, but also cultural and economic forces 
as well. 
Tang Shiping, a scholar with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, predicts 
that a relative increase in China’s regional influence will coincide with a relative decrease 
of U.S. influence.  However, he further explains that: “This will certainly not mean that 
                                                 
19 Song Qian, Unhappy China—The Great Time, Grand Vision and Our Challenges (Beijing: Zhang 
Xiaobo,2009). 
20 Senior Colonels Huang Xing and Zuo Quandian, “Holding the Initiative in Our Hands in 
Conducting Operations, Giving Full Play to Our Own Advantages To Defeat Our Enemy—A Study of the 
Core Idea of the Operational Doctrine of the People’s Liberation Army” Bejing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 
[Chinese Military Science] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science 1996), 7. In the same paragraph, Xing 
points out weaknesses with the F-117 bomber, Tomahawk cruise missile, AH-64 helicopter, and the U.S. 
DoD computer network.  Clearly, the enemy he describes is the U.S. 
21 Ibid., 15. 
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some other big power country could take over the position which the United States 
has.”22  Not only does Tang discuss the security concerns on China’s periphery, he also 
highlights the growing importance of international public opinion and advocates for an 
expanded role of Chinese media.  This is especially interesting because the emphasis is 
not on some enlightened view of freedom of speech, but rather on increasing state power.  
According to Tang, “A China which has no influence on international media would not 
be a big power in the true sense of the term.”23  This emerging strategy of employing soft 
power to project state power has a foundation in the PLA’s doctrine. 
The “three warfares” are described as the psychological, media, and legal 
dimensions of conflict.24  While the doctrine of “three warfares” has not been 
comprehensively designed and implemented across the PLA, there are recent examples of 
soft power employment.25  The PLA Daily boasts that China has sent 15,603 soldiers to 
participate in 18 separate UN peace missions since 1990.26  Statistically, this figure is 
unremarkable when compared to U.S. force deployments.  However, the type of missions 
that the PLA seems eager to undertake may be more important than the number of troops 
committed overseas. 
UN peace missions receive a lot of media attention even if the number of troops 
and amount of money committed is relatively low.  Peace missions may be a more useful 
way of employing soft power than the deployment of an aircraft carrier, for example. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Tang Shiping, “China’s Peripheral Security Environment in 2010-2015—Decisive Factors, Trends 
and Prospects.”Beijing Zhanlue yu Guanli[Beijing Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies] (Beijing: Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, 2002), 40. 
23Ibid., 54. 
24Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense in 2008, (Beijing: State Council 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2009), 8. 
25 The 2009 OSD report to Congress also articulates the PLA’s concept of the three warfares: 
Psychological, Media, and Legal Warfare.  This roughly mirrors current U.S. IO doctrine (Joint Publication 
3-13, Information Operations, 2006) which includes cyber attack and defense, military deception, 
electronic warfare, psychological operations, operational security, and public affairs.  However, the United 
States has had much more employment experience than China has. 
26 Chen Jie, “China Sends 15,603 Soldiers on UN Peace Missions in 20 Years,” PLA Daily (Beijing: 
China Military Online, 2010)  http://eng.mod.gov.cn/SpecialReports/2010-07/07/content_4211551.htm 
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Most importantly, these missions and the “three warfares” doctrine comprise an 
asymmetrical approach designed to mitigate the overwhelming technological advantage 
of the United States military. 
A Chinese strategy of A2/AD requires both hard and soft power employment and 
emphasizes asymmetry.  Parity between conventional or nuclear forces is not an 
immediate priority.  Instead, the PLA seeks to influence the regional situation to prevent 
conflict with the United States if possible, and to achieve swift, decisive, limited victories 
if necessary.  Although there is much disagreement about the peaceful nature of China’s 
rise, the official position from Beijing is to work with, not against, Washington.  The 
Chinese foreign minister recently stated: “Generally, the Chinese-U.S. relationship has 
grown at a steady pace.  We are willing to enhance contact and cooperation on 
international and regional issues with the U.S. through dialogue and exchange at various 
levels.”27  Despite these assurances, Beijing is developing a strategy designed to limit 
U.S. influence in the western Pacific. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The scope of this thesis is limited to understanding China’s historical security 
perspective, current PLA modernization efforts, and implications for America’s future 
security posture in Asia.  In order to understand why the PRC perceives the United States 
as a major security threat and how this perception is driving PLA modernization efforts, 
China’s military history and current defense strategy are analyzed.  First, China’s 
evolution of military strategy is examined in Chapter II in order to understand what 
factors drive changes within the PLA.  Second, the current grand strategy of the PLA is 
examined in Chapter III in order to understand what the existing doctrine and capabilities 
of the PLA are.  This analysis aims to clarify China’s defense policy and military 
modernization program in order to identify implications for American interests and 
develop options for American policymakers. 
                                                 
27 Mo Hong’e, “China-U.S. ties should be cooperative, not zero-sum:  Chinese FM,” Xinhua News 
Agency (Beijing: Xinhua News Agency Inc., 1 Dec 2010), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-12/01/c_13630589.htm, 
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II. EVOLUTION OF CHINESE MILITARY DOCTRINE 
In order to understand what drives changes in military doctrine and the 
development of capabilities, it is useful to understand what factors have typically caused 
these types of changes in China’s recent past.  Globally, the CCP acts as a balancer 
against hegemony.  This can be considered the “golden rule” of Chinese foreign policy 
and accounts not only for Chinese strategic alignment, but also Chinese military strategy 
as well.  If perceived threats cause changes to China’s defense strategies, and if China 
consistently balances against hegemony, then it makes sense that America’s unipolarity 
seems threatening to the PRC and therefore drives PLA modernization efforts.  Since 
1949, Beijing has adjusted its defense strategies to deal with perceived changes in its 
threat environment and it currently sees the United States as its primary security threat, 
mainly because of U.S. involvement in the Taiwan Strait. 
A. 1950–1959:  ALLIANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION 
[China and the Soviet Union] undertake to carry out jointly all necessary 
measures within their power to prevent a repetition of aggression and 
breach of the peace by Japan or any other State which might directly or 
indirectly join with Japan in acts of aggression.28 
The context of this period was one of alliance with, and reliance on, the Soviet 
Union by the Chinese.  American economic and security arrangements with the Republic 
of China, the Japanese, and eventually the South Koreans, made the United States the 
main threat to Mao’s newly established government.  The Soviet Union, on the other 
hand, offered critical support to Mao from the very beginning of the PRC’s consolidation 
of power in Beijing. 
Using 1949 as a starting point is useful because of the transformative nature of the 
CCP’s victory.  In the early half of the 20th century, China had witnessed the end of an 
empire, the rise and fall of regional warlords, subjugation through great power 
                                                 
28 The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (Beijing: 14 Feb 1950), “any other State” was widely 
understood to be the United States when the treaty was signed. 
 10 
occupation, war with Japan, and a civil war.  After decades of war, China’s economy was 
devastated and the CCP lacked sufficient resources to support, let alone modernize, the 
PLA.  Maintaining a robust military capability was essential to prevent a counterattack 
from the KMT, the Japanese, the Americans, or an alliance between all three.  
Furthermore, the PLA needed a sizable force to conduct a major campaign against a UN 
coalition on the Korean Peninsula. 
The Korean War hardened the CCP’s alignment with the Soviet Union by 
ensuring that Western, and especially American, engagement with the PRC would be 
impossible for decades.  Although PLA involvement certainly affected the outcome of 
the war, the aftermath of the armistice had an ambiguous effect on the PLA and the PRC.  
On one hand, the PLA had fought the UN coalition to a standstill and ensured the 
sovereignty of a neighboring communist country.  On the other hand, the effectiveness of 
Western, and especially American, technology had a devastating impact on the Chinese 
and reinforced the reliance on Soviet assistance.  Although the PRC may have preferred 
to develop its own modern military capabilities, it did not have the economic capability 
or technical skills to do so.  At the same time, Beijing still faced what it perceived to be 
credible and imminent threats from the United States, Japan, and the Republic of China. 
Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953 meant that Mao would have to establish a new 
relationship with his successor to ensure continued Soviet assistance.  Although the 
relationship started out well, Khrushchev’s anti-Stalin statements and policies soon made 
Mao uneasy. Adding to Mao’s skepticism was the Taiwan Strait crisis that began in 1958.  
Although there was little change between Mainland China and Taiwan in terms of 
casualties or territory following the crisis, the response by the respective superpowers had 
a lasting impression on both Chiang and Mao.  The immediate and credible response by 
the U.S. 7th Fleet demonstrated an American willingness to intervene and nuclear 
weapons were even discussed as an option.  Arguably more important for Mao however, 
was the lack of response from the USSR.  Whether the Soviets had no intention of 
responding or were simply unprepared to do so may be irrelevant, the fact that the Soviets 
did not show up when the Americans did fueled Mao’s growing anxiety over continued 
Soviet assistance. 
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B. 1959–LATE 1970S:  PEOPLE’S WAR 
Not only must we have a powerful regular army, we must also organize 
contingents of the people’s militia on a big scale. This will make it 
difficult for the imperialists to move a single inch in our country in the 
event of invasion.29 
A common misconception about Mao is that he always favored guerrilla warfare 
over conventional warfare.  During the war against Japan, Mao declared: “Our strategy 
should be to employ our main forces to operate over an extended and fluid front.”30  This 
was known as mobile warfare which contrasted with positional warfare and sought to 
maximize China’s vast territory to overextend and exploit Japan’s lines of 
communication.  Mao summarized the primacy of mobile warfare over guerilla warfare 
during a series of talks in 1938:  
Among the forms of warfare in the anti-Japanese war mobile warfare 
comes first and guerrilla warfare second. When we say that in the entire 
war mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, we 
mean that the outcome of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, 
especially in its mobile form, and that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder 
the main responsibility in deciding the outcome.31 
For Mao, revolutionary warfare was divided into three phases:  The strategic 
defensive, the strategic consolidation or stalemate, and the strategic counter-offensive.32  
During much of Mao’s lifetime, and throughout most of his military campaigns, guerilla 
warfare was extensively used because it was the only realistic option for the PLA.  The 
Sino-Soviet alliance gave Mao the opportunity to advance beyond guerilla warfare and 
modernize the military.  However, the Sino-Soviet split left Mao bereft of any significant 
external assistance and forced him to rely on domestic production for military 
modernization. 
                                                 
29 Mao Zedong, Xinhua News Agency (Beijing, 29 Sept 1958), http://art-bin.com/art/omao8.html. 
30 Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 171.  
31 Ibid., 172. 
32 Ibid., 137. 
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The years 1949 through 1959 can be described as a period of “Sino-Soviet 
alignment” not only because of the formal treaty between the two countries, but also 
because of China’s dependence on Soviet aid and hostility toward the United States, both 
of which were magnified by the Korean War.  The roots of the Sino-Soviet split are 
somewhat ambiguous.  The death of Josef Stalin in 1953 and eventual ascendency of 
Nikita Khrushchev in 1956 probably marks the initial rift between the two countries 
because of Khrushchev’s apparent break from Stalin’s ideology and policies.  Although 
Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin, rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and subsequent 
dissolution of the Communist Information Bureau were all troubling to Mao, 
Khrushchev’s 1959 meeting with President Eisenhower emphasized the Soviet Premier’s 
policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the United States and placed China in a very 
dangerous position between the two superpowers. 
Peaceful coexistence was a dangerous concept for Mao because it meant that 
Moscow might not come to defend China in the event of a conflict between the PRC and 
the United States.  Therefore, Mao’s ability to rely on Soviet assistance to balance against 
the U.S. was substantially reduced.  By 1965, China faced a militarized border with the 
Soviet Union to the north and an American build-up in Vietnam to the south.  Without 
Soviet aid or advisors, Mao was forced to turn domestically for a defense strategy.  Using 
the only resources available at the time, a large population and a vast countryside, the 
PLA altered its strategy to “people’s war” to counter the threat from dual adversaries. 
In its preparation for total, protracted war against either superpower, “people’s 
war” sought to lure the invader deep into China’s territory while trading space for time 
and even sacrificing industrial cities in an attempt to overextend an opponent’s lines of 
communication which could then be exploited through mass and mobility.  The newly 
formed PLAAF and PLAN were maintained in support roles and the infantry was 
considered to be decisive.  The emphasis on infantry forces over advanced weaponry is 
important because it highlights the impact of China’s severe diplomatic and economic 
isolation during this time. 
Under these circumstances, “people’s war” seems to be the least-worst option.  
China could rely on its sheer size, in terms of people and terrain, in order to trade space 
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for time in the event of an invasion.  This strategy was also necessary because of the lack 
of any significant regional allies and because of a limited ability to outfit a modern army 
through domestic production. 
C. LATE 1970S–1985:  PEOPLE’S WAR UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS 
The time has passed when America will make every other nation’s conflict 
our own, or make every other nation’s future our responsibility, or 
presume to tell the people of other nations how to manage their own 
affairs.33 
Unlike the 1950s, in which China relied on Soviet assistance for its security 
posture and military modernization program, this period saw Beijing tilt toward 
Washington as it perceived the USSR as its main security threat.  Strategic collaboration 
with the United States, along with an American withdrawal from Vietnam, allowed 
Beijing to concentrate its defense strategy against the Soviet military along the northern 
border.  Furthermore, China’s access to Western technological assistance allowed it to 
reinvigorate its military modernization program. This modernization effort required the 
abandonment of “people’s war” for the new strategy of “people’s war under modern 
conditions.” 
Although the name sounds similar, the doctrine broke from Mao’s strategy in a 
number of ways.  Instead of abandoning industrial centers in an effort to trade space for 
time, the PLA now intended to meet an invading force in the border regions using 
“positional defensive warfare,” which required combined arms in addition to infantry and 
guerilla tactics.34  In order to execute this change in defense strategy, China equipped the 
PLA with modern weaponry and professionalized the force. 
Introducing modern weaponry meant new complementary roles for the PLAAF 
and PLAN.  Professionalizing the force meant not only de-emphasizing the PLA’s 
political responsibilities, but also reducing the overall size of the army.  Taken together, 
                                                 
33 Richard Nixon, Second Inaugural Address (Washington D.C., 20 Jan 1973).  
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/richardnixonsecondinaugural.htm.  
34Ellis Joffe, “People’s War under Modern Conditions: A Doctrine for Modern War,” The China 
Quarterly (1987), 560. 
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these changes represented tectonic shifts in Chinese policy and society.  Deng’s adept 
maneuvering amongst these issues was aided by China’s access to international markets 
which dramatically improved the economy in a relatively short time. 
The American withdrawal from Vietnam along with an economic recession led to 
a perception of a reduction of American international influence in the early 1970s, while 
the growth of the Soviet Red Army and improved civil–military relations indicated rising 
Soviet power during this same period.  Predictably, Beijing tilted towards Washington to 
prevent Soviet hegemony in Asia. 
The scope of change within China resulting from adoption of “people’s war under 
modern conditions” make it clear that “modern conditions” was the important half of the 
doctrine and that “people’s war” was retained primarily to lessen the impact of such a 
dramatic transformation on leaders who served during the Mao era.  Although the Soviet 
threat along China’s northern border was still the PLA’s primary concern, by the mid-
1980s Beijing once again revised its defense strategy after analyzing the bipolar dynamic 
between the two superpowers. 
D. 1985–1992:  LOCAL, LIMITED WAR 
Reform is China’s second revolution.35 
During this period the PRC leadership made critical and astute assumptions that 
paved the way for dramatic increases in Chinese security and prosperity.  The assumption 
that neither superpower would attack or invade China allowed Deng Xiaoping to adopt a 
strategy, of “local, limited war” and implement further reforms in the PLA.  The key 
difference was Deng’s assumption that conflict between the superpowers was unlikely, an 
attack on China was unlikely, and that the most likely form of conflict would be small in 
scale and limited to China’s borders. This led to the provisions for wartime 
transformation of military regions (MRs) into war zones, within which the conflict would 
                                                 
35 Deng Xiaoping, Excerpt from a talk with Susumu Nikaido, Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] (Beijing, 
28Mar1985), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1360.html.  
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occur.  However, this shift also had dramatic implications for force development, 
including manpower, equipment, training, and planning. 
MR commanders controlled all forces within their respective region, including 
forces from other specialized services like the navy and air force.  Therefore, whereas 
combined arms was introduced to the PLA under “people’s war under modern 
conditions,” the concept of jointness evolved under the doctrine of “limited war.”  
“Limited war” also increased the importance of regional centers of power for production, 
logistics, training, and command and control as opposed to the centralized structure used 
under the previous strategy. 
This decentralization placed greater authority and responsibility on regional 
commanders but reduced the scope of military operations for the PLA as a whole.  No 
longer would military leaders be required to repel an invasion from a large military of an 
industrialized power.  Instead, quick decisive action against smaller opponents along the 
border was the focus.  This strategy allowed military and political leaders to focus their 
efforts and resources on economic development without placing China in a security 
crisis. 
The reform policies proved to be extremely effective at improving the economy 
and modernizing the military.  However, the collapse of the Soviet Union created a new 
batch of problems for China.  Although the USSR had been the primary security concern 
since the 1960s, the Soviet Union was also recognized as the only state capable of 
balancing against the United States.  With this capability removed, America’s already 
substantial influence in the region would increase. 
E. 1992–2003: LOCAL, LIMITED WAR UNDER HIGH TECHNOLOGY 
CONDITIONS 
Science and technology are crucial forces of production.  China and its 
military modernization must depend on the progress of science and 
technology.  The practice of every limited local war, especially the most 
recent war tells us that modern warfare has become high-tech warfare.  It 
is a multi-dimensional war, electronic war, missile war.  The backward 
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one is beaten…military buildup in peace should take the road of 
quality…such is our major principle in military modernization.36 
This period contains the recent causes of many existing tensions between the 
United States and China.  Although both countries maintained overall friendly relations 
with each other, both countries also changed their respective perceptions of the other.  
The PRC re-evaluated the security threat posed by the United States after it became the 
sole remaining superpower, while the United States altered its view of China after the 
Tiananmen Square incident.  Western arms sanctions, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, and a demonstrated U.S. willingness to employ its 
military around the globe unilaterally, all contributed to China’s growing apprehension 
over unchecked U.S. power.  Despite these various issues, China continued its integration 
into the world economy as well as domestic economic reforms.  Most importantly, the 
PLA realized that a major war was not imminent and was therefore afforded the 
opportunity to further modernize the military.  This realization gave rise to the emphasis 
on science and technology and led to a new strategy of “local, limited war under high 
technology conditions.” 
Beijing’s initial concerns over the U.S.’s primacy in the international system were 
quickly validated during Operation Desert Storm.  In the new unipolar environment, the 
American leadership was explicit about its intentions of using its position as the only 
remaining superpower to shape the international system to advance its interests.  Once 
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, President Bush was prepared to use his peace dividend 
to repel the Iraqi army from an important Middle Eastern ally.  For Beijing the logic was 
clear:  If the United States interfered in Middle Eastern affairs, why not Taiwan, Tibet or 
North Korea? 
Most alarming for China’s military leaders was the actual conduct of the 
American operation which pitted superior U.S. technology against inferior conventional 
weapons, many of which were Chinese.  Most people were stunned by images of guided 
missiles flying into specific windows on key buildings and by the “highway of death,” 
                                                 
36 Jiang Zemin, Jiefangjun Bao [PLA Daily] (Beijing: China Military Online 20 Mar 1991), 
http://irchina.org/en/xueren/china/view.asp?id=678.  
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which highlighted the devastation of Iraqi armored, mechanized, and motorized forces by 
American airpower.  These images had such an impact on China that the PLA adopted 
yet another defense strategy that reflected the need to dominate not only with firepower 
but also with information. 
What was clear to the PLA leadership in the early 1990s was that the scope and 
pace of China’s military modernization program was not adequate for the overwhelming 
capabilities of the United States.  Besides announcing a new defense strategy, China 
accelerated its acquisition of sophisticated military technologies from countries like Israel 
and especially Russia.  As China’s military improved technologically and professionally, 
it also began to broaden its scope of operations by preparing to fight in a multi-
dimensional battlespace in air, land, sea, and even space.  The new emphasis on science 
and technology meant that the PLA began to favor machines over man, in stark contrast 
with “people’s war.”  To counter the growing influence of the United States, China’s new 
strategy would focus on increasing technological production domestically and improving 
diplomatic relations abroad. 
Beijing vigorously sought to technologically improve its military but realized that 
modernization efforts were falling short after the 1991 Gulf War.  Furthermore, concerns 
over America’s tendency to interfere in China’s domestic politics spiked sharply in 1995 
during the rise of Taiwan’s independence politics.  Despite great strides in economic 
development and military modernization, the PLA was still unable to counter the robust 
expeditionary capabilities of America’s military during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis.  
Without any other power capable of, or willing to, counter the influence of the United 
States, China’s perception of the United States as a major security threat was reinforced.  
Not only did China once again change its military strategy to deal with this threat, it also 
sought out partners to help balance against it. 
F. 2004–PRESENT:  LOCAL, LIMITED WAR UNDER CONDITIONS OF 
INFORMATIZATION 
[China and Russia] shall energetically promote the consolidation of 
stability of the surrounding areas of the two countries, create an 
atmosphere of mutual understanding, trust and cooperation, and promote 
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efforts aimed at setting up a multi-lateral co-ordination mechanism which 
complies with the actual situation of the above-mentioned areas on issues 
of security and cooperation.37 
The military and military technology cooperation of [China and Russia] 
carried out in accordance with the relevant agreements are not directed at 
third countries.38 
A new Sino-Russian Treaty was signed in 2001 to solidify the partnership of these 
two regional powers.  Although the 2001 treaty invites comparison with the Sino-Soviet 
Treaty of 1950, there is no explicit language obligating each country to the defense of the 
other.  However, the treaty does call for advancing multipolarity globally, a condition that 
would likely dilute American hegemony.  This is not to say that either China or Russia 
favored conflict or confrontation with the United States.  On the contrary, each of these 
partners heavily relies on the U.S. economically and therefore downplays their respective 
desires to see a reduced American presence in Asia.   
“Local, limited war under conditions of informatization” remains the official 
strategy of the PLA since 2004.  While this new strategy is still emerging and highly 
conceptual, it is clear that the PLA views information as a critical component to modern 
warfare.  A growing emphasis on cyber and space-based capabilities indicates not only 
how the PLA intends to fight in the next war, but also what capabilities it expects 
potential enemies to have.  
This situation is certainly complex but makes sense in the current globalized 
environment.  Countries naturally want to promote their interests as much as possible at 
home and on their periphery.  As we have seen, the PRC has always attempted to secure 
its borders and promote its interests abroad. More importantly, China has always tried to 
gain as much support as possible to blunt the encroachment of its interests by the most 
powerful regional actor.  Today, the United States is the clear dominant power in the 
region and therefore an obvious concern for the PRC leadership. 
                                                 
37“Article 14”Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's 
Republic of China and the Russian Federation (Moscow: 16 Jul 2001), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm.  
38 Ibid., Article 7. 
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Besides alignment with Russia, China has also attempted to garner the support of 
other regional actors like ASEAN.  Beijing has even created institutions like the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization to secure its economic and security interests.  However, 
balancing against the United States in a globalized environment is more complex than in 
previous eras.  Economic interdependence suggests that China and the United States 
should put aside their differences in order to mutually prosper.  As a balancer against 
hegemony, China views the United States as its greatest strategic threat outside of its own 
borders and is refining its military strategy to counter this threat. 
From the Chinese perspective, conflict with the United States is not considered to 
be imminent, nor is it desired.  For the PRC the only thing worse than engaging in a 
conflict with the United States is losing that conflict.  The most likely scenario for 
conflict with the United States is in the Taiwan Straits.  Not only has the United States 
repeatedly interfered in cross-Straits politics throughout the PRC’s history, it continues to 
sell arms to Taiwan and subsequently provoke the current PRC leadership.  To mitigate 
this scenario, the PLA is developing a strategy designed to prevent and discourage the 
U.S. from military action in the region and to rapidly and decisively win a conflict if 
necessary. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The golden rule of China’s foreign policy is that China balances against 
hegemony.  Since its inception, the PRC has changed its defense strategy to counter what 
it perceived to be the dominant regional power and therefore the greatest threat to PRC 
security.  Today, however, without a powerful superpower patron to rely on for security, 
and given the economic interconnectedness of China and the United States, balancing 
against hegemony has taken on a different tone.  China is not only seeking out alliances 
to counter U.S. regional influence but also developing a military strategy to resist 
America’s military presence in Asia. 
Throughout the evolution of China’s military, Taiwan deserves specific attention.  
American support for the Nationalist regime predates the establishment of the PRC and 
had a substantial impact on the first cross-Strait crisis in 1954.  President Eisenhower’s 
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apparent willingness to consider nuclear weapons in defending the ROC was a direct and 
serious threat to the PRC’s authority and sovereignty.  America’s subsequent 
involvement in 1958 displayed a commitment to not only threaten a strike, but to deploy 
conventional forces as well. 
With the latest crisis occurring only 15 years ago and continued arms sales to 
Taiwan since then, The Taiwan Strait represents a fundamental, persistent, severe, and 
impending obstacle for Sino-U.S. relations.  This is one of the main reasons why the PRC 
perceives the United States as a major security threat and is developing a strategy to 
counter American influence in the western Pacific through a strategy of A2/AD.  The 
next chapter describes how China’s current defense strategy intends to counter U.S. 
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III. CURRENT CHINESE DEFENSE STRATEGY 
Impressive economic growth coupled with the largest population in the world 
inevitably makes China an important factor in the international arena.  Geopolitically, 
China borders the Pacific Ocean and 14 countries, including Russia, Afghanistan, North 
Korea, India and Pakistan.  Diplomatically, China holds one of only five seats as a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council.  All of these factors make China’s 
peaceful rise in recent years one of the most important trends in world affairs. 
Understandably, the modernization and development of China’s military is a great 
concern to scholars and policy-makers alike.  This concern occasionally leads analysts to 
conclude that China’s rise challenges the United States as the world’s only superpower, 
but there is little evidence to support a global hegemonic agenda by the PLA.  
Regionally, however, the capabilities of the PLA are considerable and require an inquiry 
into the intentions of the PLA leadership.  In order to discover what Beijing’s intentions 
are, it is important to consider what capabilities are being developed.  Conversely, 
analyzing what capabilities are not being developed can lend further insight into what 
Beijing determines to be unimportant, thereby clarifying the overall strategy of the PLA.  
By examining the improving and emerging capabilities of the PLA, it is clear that Beijing 
seeks to reduce U.S. influence through a strategy of A2/AD in order to defend the 
homeland and ensure security interests at home and abroad. 
A. ANALYSIS OF MODERNIZATION EFFORTS 
China and the PLA face a number of security goals.  Defense of the coastal 
economic heartland rises in priority along with China’s powerful industrial sector.  The 
PLA must also resolve territorial conflicts along China’s borders quickly and favorably 
while maintaining readiness to address internal security concerns.  Globalization and an 
increased demand for resources elevate the importance of addressing potential maritime 
conflicts.  Ensuring freedom of movement within strategic sea lines of communication, 
including the Taiwan Straits, continues to gain importance along with China’s 
dependence on foreign trade.  Finally, a modern military advances international prestige 
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and boosts diplomatic power.  As a rising power, China naturally expects to receive the 
international recognition that accompanies a country that possesses a strong, capable 
military complete with the ability to conduct Military Operations Other Than War 
(MOOTW) and a nuclear second strike. 
With this varied and complex range of security goals, the PLA leadership has to 
adopt a doctrine that is flexible and comprehensive. China’s current doctrine is self-
described as “local, limited war under informatization.”39  This replaced “local, limited 
war under high-technology conditions” in 1993 after witnessing the effectiveness of the 
United States military in the Gulf War with Iraq.  The biggest difference between these 
two approaches to military development is the emphasis on the effects of information.  
Many analysts believe that China’s focus on information operations (IO) can provide the 
PLA with the immediate ability to disrupt or defeat enemies that rely heavily on high-
technology, like the United States. 
Within “local war under informatization,” a strategy of A2/AD is the main thrust 
of the PLA’s recent modernization efforts.  A key indicator for the development of an 
A2/AD strategy is the development of missiles, submarines, fighter aircraft, and anti-
aircraft weapons.  Each of these systems provides a very limited and specific capability.  
Although these systems can influence key terrain, they cannot occupy it.  As a result, 
these enhanced systems give the PLA a robust A2/AD capability, but do not provide for a 
wider range of military options.  Intelligence collection, military diplomacy, and many 
aspects of MOOTW remain unaddressed by developing these systems.  A narrow scope 
of operations limits a military’s flexibility and reduces overall competence. 
By sacrificing flexibility and a wider range of military operations, the PLA is able 
to focus on the development of a comprehensive approach to A2/AD.  Besides the overall 
emphasis on A2/AD systems development, each branch of service has undertaken 
responsibilities that focus primarily on A2/AD.  The ground forces are moving away 
from static garrisons in the military regions towards a more mobile force able to quickly 
reinforce along China’s periphery.  The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) 
                                                 
39Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National 
Defense in 2008 (2009): 8. 
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has a lead role in joint anti-air raid campaigns, a cornerstone of A2/AD.  The People’s 
Liberation Navy (PLAN) has three main missions: resist seaborne aggression, protect 
national sovereignty, and safeguard maritime rights.40  With the recent acquisition of 
submarines, advanced naval mines, and anti-ship ballistic missiles, the PLAN is taking a 
key role in A2/AD. 
Besides the focus of the three branches of the PLA, substantial resources have 
been devoted to the development of missiles, space warfare, integrated network 
electronic warfare, and IO.  These enabling capabilities combined with the primary roles 
of the services provide a doctrinal template for PLA operations against a peer competitor 
like the United States.  Ostensibly in a Taiwan Strait scenario, a conflict with the PLA 
would most likely commence with a non-kinetic attack on electronic, computer, and 
space based systems followed by positioning of and targeting by kinetic A2/AD systems 
along with simultaneous psychological, media, and legal warfare operations designed to 
deter continued involvement by U.S. or allied forces.41 
Although a robust A2/AD capability greatly threatens freedom of movement in 
the region, what is noticeably absent from the PLA’s agenda is development of the ability 
to counter-attack or project power beyond the shores of the mainland.  Despite having the 
most populous military in the world, the PLAAF has the ability to lift only 5,000 troops 
at a time.42  By emphasizing A2/AD and the joint anti-air raid campaign, the PLAAF is 
deficient in strategic mobility beyond China’s borders.  The PLA ground forces are able 
to respond to locations within China’s borders, but as recent relief efforts have shown, 
response abroad is extremely limited and even reaching remote locations within China’s 
                                                 
40 Office of the Secretary of Defense.  Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China 2009(Washington D.C., Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009), 11. 
41 The 2009 OSD report to Congress articulates the PLA’s concept of the “three warfares”: 
Psychological, Media, and Legal Warfare.  It is important to note that U.S. doctrine articulates national 
power through Diplomacy, Information, Military Strength, and Economics.  Furthermore, current U.S. IO 
doctrine (Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 2006) includes cyber attack and defense, military 
deception, electronic warfare, psychological operations, operational security, and public affairs.  The 
difference is that the United States has employed its current IO doctrine in various recent campaigns 
whereas the PLA only has its theory. 
42 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010, (London: Rutledge Taylor 
&Francis Group, 2010), 402. 
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borders remains problematic as well.43  The PLAN can accomplish its missions near the 
Chinese coast but has a limited capacity to project power and is noticeably not seeking an 
amphibious capability.  These systems and capabilities demonstrate that Beijing is 
primarily concerned with providing homeland defense through a strategy of A2/AD.  
This strategy can be very effective at defeating local, limited threats on or near China’s 
homeland by restricting enemy freedom of movement near China.  Operational reach, 
however, is limited to the area surrounding China’s periphery commonly referred to as 
the second island chain.  Power projection capabilities are extremely limited and 
currently under-prioritized in PLA doctrine and acquisition programs. 
B. OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
The biggest obstacles faced by the PLA are the civil-military relationship with the 
CCP, the lack of operationally experienced leadership, and a limited range of military 
operations.  The Tiananmen Square Crisis of 1989 shows that military leaders may 
question the orders of civilian leaders within the Central Military Commission and those 
civilian leaders may not fully understand how to properly employ military forces.  This 
rift raised questions of party loyalty among military members and created an 
unproductive focus on adherence to communist ideals.  Focusing on political ideology 
distracts the military member from training requirements and limits proficiency.  
Furthermore, the commissar system dilutes the authority of commanders, especially 
commanders of combat forces like infantry, artillery or tank units.  If military doctrine is 
going to rely on fewer, highly-specialized, better trained troops, it must devote as much 
time as possible to professional development.  The CCP currently hampers professional 
development and therefore the overall readiness of the PLA. 
Since withdrawing from Vietnam in 1973, the United States has conducted over 
100 military operations across the globe, ranging from humanitarian assistance and 
                                                 
43 Nirav Patel, “Chinese Disaster Relief Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Norfolk, VA: National 
Defense University Press, 2009), 111–117. 
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disaster relief to high intensity conventional combat.44  China’s 1979 incursion into 
northern Vietnam was its last significant military operation.  Operational experience is 
critical to development.  Obviously important to the leaders and troops who executed the 
mission, operational experience also provides lessons to the organizations and institutions 
involved as well.  Without the ability to refine doctrine, strategy, operational design or 
small unit tactics through real-world experience, the PLA will have an inaccurate 
assessment of its capabilities.  This miscalculation impairs the ability of PRC leadership 
to appropriately task the PLA and restricts the PLA’s ability to conduct operations 
effectively and efficiently. 
A2/AD limits the overall range of military operations the PLA can perform.  
Widening the range of operations requires the development of additional capabilities 
besides A2/AD, mainly in the form of transportation and sustainment of troops.  
Transport aircraft need to be developed in order to train for airborne and expeditionary 
operations.  Aerial refueling must also be developed to enhance strategic mobility.  More 
importantly, if the PLA wants to project power beyond its own borders a basing system 
with other countries needs to be developed.  Without international agreements with allied 
countries, the PLA will be unable to adequately sustain its ground forces once they are 
deployed or inserted into a given location. 
The development of amphibious shipping is essential to power projection and 
currently ignored by the PLAN.  Forward deployed forces dramatically widen the range 
of military operations.  Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military diplomacy 
through training exercises, and security and stability operations are all facilitated by 
maintaining an amphibious force in readiness.  However, the development of amphibious 
ships would certainly raise concerns about China’s intentions toward Taiwan and could 
degrade relations with the United States as well. 
Despite many domestic and international obstacles, the PRC has some unique 
opportunities as well.  China’s continued economic growth is the PLA’s best asset right 
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now and is essential to modernization efforts.  After decades of solid double-digit growth 
in GDP, the PRC is able to shift focus from the agricultural, industrial, and technological 
sectors towards the military.  While this adjustment will definitely improve the quality 
and quantity of material, the PLA leadership must ensure that a coherent and 
comprehensive doctrine that promotes overall strategic security goals drives research, 
development, and procurement. 
One pitfall of a strong industrial sector is the potential for industry to employ 
political action in order to advance its own agenda.  In his final speech as president, 
Dwight Eisenhower warned the United States that: “In the councils of government, we 
must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, 
by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced 
power exists and will persist.”45  As China’s own military-industrial complex matures 
and gains influence, civilian and military leaders must ensure that they are the ones 
formulating policy, and that industry is appropriately addressing their needs. 
The biggest opportunity that is currently not being exploited is China’s friendly 
association with the United States.  Despite ideological contradictions, China and the 
United States have a much more open and accepting relationship than other communist 
countries like North Korea, Cuba, or Venezuela.  Unlike the Cold War, there is no 
imminent threat of nuclear war or proxy wars fought in peripheral countries like Korea, 
Vietnam, or Afghanistan.  In fact, there are many areas in which the United States and the 
PLA could combine efforts. 
By reinforcing NATO in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, the PLA 
could gain relevant operational experience and form alliances with professional modern 
militaries like Australia, Germany, and the United States.  Anti-piracy operations also 
provide a context for the PLA to interact with other regional militaries.  Finding common 
ground to work with other military forces is possible despite political and ideological 
differences. 
                                                 




Military diplomacy is critical to enhancing transparency and essential in 
promoting a dialogue between potential allies.  Without the polarity that existed during 
the Cold War, military diplomacy remains an unrealized opportunity.  Prioritizing 
military diplomacy would enhance non-material related modernization efforts of the PLA 
and promote China’s influence in world affairs. 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
China’s current strategy of A2/AD is intended to protect the homeland, especially 
the coastal economic heartland, and local regional interests like strategic sea lines of 
communication.  However, a comprehensive and robust ability to dominate freedom of 
movement can upset the regional balance of power.  In order for the balance of power to 
dramatically shift in favor of the PRC certain conditions must be present.  First, the 
United States needs to withdraw from the region, either voluntarily or through coercion.  
Also, neighboring countries must be militarily outclassed.  Finally, China must ensure 
that Russia continues to supply the PLA with weapons and equipment while maintaining 
current levels of high economic growth and stability. 
On the first two counts conditions are not currently set, nor are they likely to be in 
the near future.  The United States maintains a great interest in Asia and will continue 
operations and exercises in theater.  As the recent resignation of the Japanese Prime 
Minister Hatoyama shows, allied countries like Japan and South Korea still count on the 
U.S. Military for security and economic development.  Meanwhile, the United States 
continues to enhance the capabilities and diplomatic relationships with our regional allies 
who in turn develop their own sophisticated, capable militaries. 
On the second two counts, continued Russian arms deals and continued economic 
growth, the future is less clear.  Any number of events could disrupt the Russian supply 
line of weapons and equipment.  Alliances or agreements with the United States, a re-
focusing of Moscow’s economic agenda, or a Sino-Russian conflict are all feasible 
situations that could interrupt Russian arms sales to China. 
Finally, continued economic growth is essential to maintain the current pace of 
modernization.  Just as the economies of Japan in the 1980s and the United States in the 
 30 
1990s seemed unstoppable, the global financial crisis shows that even the most mature 
and robust economies are subject to larger market forces.  If China’s economic growth 
does not continue at its current pace, modernization efforts will be dramatically degraded 
for the PLA. 
D. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TAIWAN 
China’s A2/AD strategy seems specifically designed to prevent U.S. involvement 
in the Taiwan Straits.  With limited airlift and amphibious capabilities, the PLA may be 
even more concerned with U.S. intervention in the Straits than with Taiwan’s 
independence politics which have slowed since the mid-1990s, anyway.  American 
involvement in a future cross-straits conflict can directly challenge the CCP’s ability to 
secure its borders and protect its people.  Losing this challenge can embolden other anti-
communist groups, encourage mass mobilization, and threaten the regime’s authority. 
This concern has been somewhat validated throughout history by U.S. support for 
the Republic of China and the KMT.  By the third Taiwan Strait crisis, the United States 
had recognized the PRC over the ROC as the official government of China for only 15 
years.  Despite normalized diplomatic relations with Beijing and increasing bi-lateral 
trade arrangements, the United States still deployed carrier strike groups to the region to 
deter further military aggression by the PLA.  Once again, the PRC was compelled to 
alter its treatment of Taiwan because of American military force.  Shortly after the 1996 
crisis, China acquired strike aircraft, destroyers, and submarines from Russia in order to 
mitigate America’s carrier capability in future conflicts.  This accelerated acquisition plan 
was the genesis of China’s current A2/AD strategy. 
If the United States represents a major security threat to China, America’s ability 
to intervene in the Taiwan Strait is arguably its most threatening aspect.  However, the 
CCP leadership was not the only group concerned with American interference in the 
Straits.  As China rises, so does a strong sense of national pride and unity.  This 
nationalism is deliberately encouraged by the Chinese government when mutual interests 
align and quickly prohibited when they do not.  Following the 1999 bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO forces, the Chinese government encouraged 
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student protests of the United States and even provided transportation to facilitate mass 
demonstrations.  However, once the protesters began to criticize the CCP’s handling of 
the situation, the protests were quickly ended and the crowds immediately dispersed. 
In China, nationalism is a powerful and dangerous force that is gaining 
momentum.  In a Taiwan Strait conflict, nationalism could be the key variable that 
determines the next outcome.  Understandably, most mainland Chinese disapprove of 
U.S. military interference in the Strait, regardless of how justified or reasonable the 
United States thinks its action is.  If national pride unites the Chinese people behind their 
government, then the PRC may find itself with sufficient political will to resist American 
pressure.  However, if nationalism rallies the people against their government, then 
domestic and international pressure could create a crisis from which the PRC leadership 
might not recover.  Obviously a quick, decisive victory is the best solution for the PRC in 
another Taiwan Strait conflict and is therefore a major reason why the PLA has adopted 
its current strategy. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Impressive economic growth has naturally led to the development of modern 
military systems and equipment.  In order to resolve territorial conflicts quickly and 
favorably along China’s borders and critical sea lanes, especially in the Taiwan Strait, the 
PLA is developing a comprehensive strategy to affect key terrain by maximizing 
technology and leveraging information systems. However, even with continued 
development of sophisticated and capable weapons, the PLA faces real challenges in the 
modernization and professionalization of its military forces. 
Inexperience, a narrow range of military operations, and tenuous civil-military 
relationships all degrade the PLA’s ability to modernize.  Without significant regional 
partnerships, the capability of the PLA remains limited.  A strategy of A2/AD impedes 
military diplomacy and reduces the ability of the PLA to create alliances or partnerships.  
Over the long term, a comprehensive strategy of A2/AD may be too successful and leave 
China isolated in the region without important friends or alliances. 
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While it is understandable that Beijing desires multipolarity over American 
hegemony, checking the influence of the United States could be dangerous and costly.  In 
a world of ever-increasing globalization, isolation would surely affect China’s economy 
and could bring about an internal crisis for resources.  Paradoxically, the greatest threat to 




Figure 2.   China’s Group Armies (From: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China 2008). 
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Figure 3.   China’s Air Forces (From: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China 2008). 
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Figure 4.   China’s Naval Forces (From: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008). 
 36 
 
Figure 5.   China’s Power Projection in the Western Pacific (From: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009).
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Figure 6.   China’s Conventional Reach (From: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
2008). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
China’s rise is naturally provocative to the United States given its position as the 
dominant power in the region.  This does not necessarily mean that conflict is inevitable, 
just that the impact of perceptions is amplified.  Both China and the United States have 
imperfect track records managing perceptions throughout Asia.  Mutual misperceptions 
and mistrust between the two countries make it difficult to address important regional 
issues like North Korea’s aggression, mineral rights in the South China Sea, and cross-
Strait relationships.  Before misperceptions cause both countries to inadvertently cross a 
security threshold, it is important to assess the implications of China’s military 
modernization program and review available options for America’s security posture in 
Asia. 
A. IMPLICATIONS 
The most important and obvious implication of China’s military modernization 
program is that the United States must either develop anti-A2/AD capabilities or accept a 
more limited security role in Asia.  A weak China means that the United States can more 
easily rely on military force and economic power to exert its influence.  As China rises 
economically and militarily, the United States must pay more attention to its policies and 
actions in the region and especially those that affect China specifically. 
This is already happening.  America’s response to China’s A2/AD strategy is the 
air-sea battle concept.  Based on the air-land battle concept developed in Europe during 
the Cold War, air-sea battle is designed to defeat those capabilities that limit freedom of 
action in the Western Pacific.  What is startling is that this emerging strategy is explicit in 
its application against the PLA.  Typically, U.S. military doctrine is written in 
generalities so it can apply to similar threats from various sources.  Air-sea battle is 
different in that it is designed to counter one specific adversary, and that it states 
unambiguously who that adversary is. Moreover, it is designed to counter an opponent 
that has not even been declared adversarial by the U.S. leadership. 
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Neither China’s strategy of A2/AD nor America’s strategy of air-sea battle should 
be surprising or unexpected.  The PRC has always balanced against the dominant power 
in the region and altered its defense strategy to deal with perceived threats.  The United 
States has been the world’s only superpower for over 20 years now and has repeatedly 
used its primacy to project its power across the globe.  The 1991 Gulf War highlighted 
the prowess of America’s military technology and coalition building ability, while the 
2003 invasion of Iraq demonstrated an American willingness to occupy a sovereign 
country unilaterally if needed.  Meanwhile, the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis reinforced 
America’s resolve to intervene in cross-Strait politics, a resolve that is continually 
reiterated to the PRC through U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  In this context, a strategy that 
relies on mainly defensive weaponry and tactics seems to be the rational choice.  Since 
China balances against hegemony and changes its defense strategy to deal with perceived 
threats, a strategy of A2/AD is fairly predictable. 
On the other hand, predictability does not make China’s strategy any less 
provocative to the United States.  Not only is the scope and pace of China’s rise alarming 
by itself, but the adoption of a strategy that is specifically designed to counter American 
influence is inherently confrontational.  America’s emerging strategy is a logical attempt 
to retain its influence in the region.  According to the concept’s authors: 
A ‘roll-back’ of the PLA’s military power is not the objective here. Nor is 
containment of China proposed. Rather, we advocate simply offsetting the 
PLA’s unprovoked and unwarranted military buildup.46 
Prior to the Korean War, the Truman Administration also dismissed the idea of 
rollback, and the Korean Peninsula was considered to be outside the area of containment.  
In fact, General MacArthur was issued specific instructions to halt his advance if he 
thought Chinese or Soviet troops were involved.  Despite these efforts deliberately 
designed to prevent conflict, tens of thousands of Americans were killed, and hundreds of 
thousands of Chinese.  All of this is to show that even though both countries are 
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advancing strategies that they consider to be reasonable, appropriate, and un-provocative, 
perceptions are a natural and important side effect of military strategy. 
B. OPTIONS 
1. Status Quo 
Air–sea battle is still conceptual in nature but there are signs that it will receive 
favorable endorsement from senior military leaders and become official policy soon.  
This strategy is attractive because it emphasizes America’s technological advantage and 
focuses on space and cyberspace domains instead of relying primarily on costly and 
dangerous troop deployments.  America’s tolerance for massive troop deployments has 
been waning since the war on terror began in 2001.  Furthermore, air-sea battle offers a 
realistic counter to China’s emerging strategy of A2/AD.  Certainly America’s allies 
would support this strategy because they could continue to free-ride without providing 
additional large bases or territory. 
However, the status quo and the air-sea battle concept face certain problems.  
First, just as China’s A2/AD strategy seems provocative to the United States, a strategy 
that is specifically aimed at the western Pacific reinforces China’s perception of the 
United States as a major security threat.  Economic interdependence may prevent another 
Cold War, but China’s increasing access to military technologies, emphasis on research 
and development, and mutual misperceptions could lead to an arms race.  Misperceptions 
combined with weapons proliferation could lead to expensive outcomes for both 
countries.  Whereas both strategies seek to deter the other from aggression, neither is well 
suited to address perceptions or facilitate engagement. 
The second obstacle faced by the U.S. military is an increasing competition over 
resources within the military.  A constant dilemma for military leaders is to focus on 
increasing and improving legacy systems, which air–sea battle calls for, or to shift 
resources to combating irregular warfare.  On one hand, irregular warfare, including 
counter-insurgency operations, appears to be increasing in frequency, complexity, and 
severity.  On the other hand, conventional threats, like those found in China’s A2/AD 
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strategy, are less common but potentially more dangerous for U.S. interests abroad and 
arguably more appropriate for the current force structure of the U.S. military anyway.  As 
budgetary constraints amplify the competition for resources, air–sea battle may become 
more difficult to employ. 
Finally, the air–sea battle concept is expensive.  Even if DoD adopts this policy 
over irregular warfare and endorses it for use within the western Pacific, air–sea battle 
calls for additional research and development investments along with industrial 
production.  At a time when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs describes the national debt 
as America’s biggest security threat, it is somewhat difficult to justify an increase in 
system design and industrial production.  Recent program cancellations like the 
Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle and the secondary F-35 engine highlight DoD’s 
apprehension for expensive legacy system upgrades. 
2. Increased Presence 
Although almost every U.S. politician describes the debt as a critical problem 
these days, there is little consensus on what the impact should be on military operations 
abroad.  Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institute argues that: 
American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for 
decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept 
open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of 
growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United 
States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China 
which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back 
to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing 
economies.  If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it 
is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between 
accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by 
building nuclear weapons.47 
For Kagan, and many others in Washington, America’s global military presence 
has been the key to prosperity for the past 65 years and should therefore be exempted 
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from budget cuts not only because of the security risks involved, but also because of the 
growth and prosperity provided by open international trade routes. 
Increasing America’s presence in East Asia would be somewhat difficult without 
a compelling reason for the United States to do so.  Although America’s allies largely 
support the U.S. military’s presence, few are eager to sacrifice territory for bases.  
America’s largest bases in Japan and Korea required wars to obtain.  The Philippines, for 
example, will not reopen either the U.S. naval base at Subic Bay or Clark Air Base 
without a severe and imminent threat from a common enemy.  Increasing America’s 
presence in the region could deter China from becoming that common enemy, or it could 
provoke China into an arms race. 
Since China balances against hegemony and alters its defense strategy to deal 
with perceived threats, the PRC will seek out any available multilateral institutions and 
advance a defense strategy that restricts America’s freedom of movement.  If U.S. 
military presence increases, the PRC will seek to interfere with U.S. alliances, utilize soft 
power wherever possible, and continue to develop capabilities and doctrine designed to 
disrupt America’s freedom of movement.  As long as China’s economic growth remains 
strong and it perceives the United States as a threat, these initiatives will accelerate as 
American presence is increased. 
3. Decreased Presence 
If increasing America’s presence risks provoking China, decreasing America’s 
presence risks emboldening China.  Among other factors, the withdrawal of U.S. forces 
from the Korean Peninsula may have emboldened the communists into thinking that the 
United States would not defend it.  One of the reasons that the Korean War was so costly 
in terms of blood and treasure is because the Truman Administration aggressively 
reduced the size of the military after WWII, and was forced to build back up at the outset 
of the war.  A similar concern exists today in the context of a rising China amongst a 
backdrop of declining American prosperity.  Many Americans feel that it is better to have 
a large forward deployed military force and not need it, than to need a large forward 
deployed military force and not have it.  However, to use Kagan’s argument, if the United 
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States reduces its presence in East Asia, America’s allies might strike out on their own 
accord and therefore share the burden of regional security costs.  In fact, decreasing 
America’s forward presence and regional involvement may be the only way to encourage 
regional partners to burden share security responsibilities.  Ironically, a decreased 
presence could actually improve regional security by forcing America’s allies to take a 
more active role in their defense.   
One of the strengths of China’s A2/AD strategy is that the United States has 
provided the PLA with large, vulnerable, high-payoff targets.  Not only are the bases on 
Japan targetable, but so are the +1,000ft aircraft carriers that continuously patrol the area.  
Many of the legacy systems like aircraft carriers can be countered with Chinese weapons 
like the DF-21D missile, while large U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea can be attacked 
with missiles and short range strike aircraft.  Mines, missiles, submarines and strike 
aircraft are all relatively cheap and easy to build weapons that can inflict a lot of pain on 
U.S. forces currently used in the region. 
4. A New Approach 
The United States should invest in anti-A2/AD systems while it still has a 
substantial advantage in sophisticated military technology.  Developing smaller platforms 
that employ unmanned aircraft, along with surface and subsurface unmanned systems 
could help restore America’s freedom of movement in the Western Pacific without a 
large buildup of easily targetable personnel.  Best of all, the continued use of unmanned 
systems throughout Operation Enduring Freedom, especially in Pakistan, highlights the 
importance of these systems to the competing interests of an irregular warfare strategy. 
The dual-use nature of these types of systems makes unmanned vehicles a critical 
component of future U.S. military doctrine and strategy. 
A dispersal of U.S. bases could mitigate a key advantage in China’s strategy and 
promote burden sharing while encouraging fiscal austerity.  Best of all, there is already a 
template for this.  Revising the regional basing policy throughout Asia can be 
accomplished by constructing a network of cooperative security locations (CSLs) which 
are smaller, host nation supported facilities reserved for American forces that can expand 
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when needed.48  By closing down major bases in Japan and Korea, regional allies will be 
encouraged to take a more active role in providing for their own security.  Meanwhile, 
maintaining a network of CSLs would provide the U.S. the ability to rapidly scale nodal 
centers of support to more appropriately fit the current situation on the ground. 
During times of peace, CSLs would be minimally staffed and maintain only the 
necessary equipment for routine operations.  During a crisis, as forces deploy from the 
U.S. as needed, the CSLs increase in size, capacity, and throughput.  Creating the ability 
to adjust capacity and throughput in key locations to compensate for the current situation 
is simply more efficient than maintaining large bases indefinitely.  Although the speed of 
a U.S. response would be reduced, this reduction would encourage burden sharing among 
regional partners and allies.  The United States can maintain a hard-power edge by 
leveraging technology and promoting burden sharing while advancing soft power 
initiatives by reducing its conventional military footprint in the region. 
Finally, empowering China to take a more active role in Asia’s security is in 
America’s interest because of the shared interests and mutual threats faced by each 
country.  Both countries want security, stability, and economic prosperity.  Both countries 
oppose terrorism, piracy, WMD proliferation, and radical Islam.  A stronger regional 
security role for China might make some of America’s allies nervous, but a moderate 
apprehension could promote burden sharing while increasing the importance of a friendly 
relationship with the United States.  As long as America retains the strongest economy 
and military on the planet, it will remain the critical component of Asia’s security even if 
its footprint is reduced. 
Most importantly, the U.S. military can serve as an example for China to emulate.  
The PLA wants to modernize and the U.S. can shape their development through 
combined military operations and exercises.  As America’s footprint is reduced through a 
combination of technological innovation and revised basing practices, the remaining 
force structure can be revised and reassigned.  Force reductions can be made wherever 
appropriate and reassignment to a mission of military diplomacy can have a critical 
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impact on shaping the PLA and Sino-U.S. relations.  Engagement on this level will not 
only shed light onto the PLA’s capabilities, doctrine, and intentions, but will also reduce 
tensions and eventually facilitate the emergence of a powerful regional ally. 
5. Perspective on China’s Threat 
Concerns over China’s rise are understandable but seem somewhat over 
exaggerated.  A worst-case scenario where China becomes a regional hegemon and 
attempts to limit U.S. influence beyond an acceptable threshold would be 
counterproductive not only to China’s soft-power message of a peaceful rise, but also to 
its economy which serves as the guarantor of regime security domestically. 
 
Figure 7.   Gross Domestic Product (After: The World Bank, 
http://databank.worldbank.org). 
Although China’s rise over the past three decades has been impressive, its 
economic power in both absolute and relative terms is still far behind the United States.  
China’s GDP of $4.9 trillion is still only roughly one-third of the size of America’s 
$14.8 trillion.49  However, per capita GDP between the two countries is arguably even 
more telling.  America’s $40,000 per capita GDP is ten times bigger than China’s per 
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capita GDP of only $4,000.  Although the income of most Chinese has certainly 
increased in recent years, many Chinese remain in poverty.  In other words, America’s 
economic power is three times bigger than China’s, and, on average, Americans are ten 
times wealthier than Chinese.  All of this may oversimplify the economic situation 
between the two countries; however, these numbers are mainly intended to show the 
considerable gap between the largest economy in the world and China’s admirable 
second-place ranking. 
 
Figure 8.   Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (After: The World Bank, 
http://databank.worldbank.org). 
Likewise, China’s military modernization program has made great strides 
recently, but still lags far behind the capabilities of the United States.  China has nuclear 
weapons but they are small in quantity and have inefficient and vulnerable delivery 
systems.  Although the PLAN is developing an aircraft carrier, it still lacks the 
infrastructure to train pilots, build or maintain deployable aircraft, or the expertise to plan 
and execute operations.  The PLAAF may have designed a stealth aircraft, or they may 
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experience of employing sophisticated weaponry is a major factor in planning and 
executing military campaigns and is largely absent from many planners and commanders 
in the Chinese military today. 
The acquisition of expensive equipment does not necessarily directly translate 
into military proficiency.  Just as new shoes on an opponent pose little threat to a 
professional basketball player during a game, China’s military acquisition program is 
only part of its overall modernization program and poses little threat to the world’s only 
superpower.  Furthermore, the United States is not complacent toward China’s rise and 
will continue to adapt and improve its own military. 
Without important alliances beyond China’s periphery, the PLA will not be able 
to project power in a manner that could counter America’s military or threaten America’s 
key interests.  The United States has an extensive alliance network and treaties in force 
with almost every country on the planet.  Recent history has shown that the United States 
can rely on important allies like England, Germany, and Japan, as well as robust 
coalitions like NATO, to support long-term military conflicts.  In the western Pacific, 
Japan, South Korea, and Australia are just a few examples of reliable and important U.S. 
allies.  Meanwhile, China’s relationship with North Korea seems to be more of a liability 
than an asset.  China’s other important potential allies like Russia, ASEAN, and SCO-
member countries all have economic and security interests with the United States as well.  
Whereas America has a proven, albeit imperfect, history of coalition building during 
recent military conflicts, China’s last conflict coalition was in the Korean War. 
America’s unrivaled military strength is the result of a combination of 
sophisticated technology, constant operational experience, and a global presence through 
extensive alliances, partnerships, and agreements.  America’s reach is global and its 
military is powerful.  As China strives to attain international prestige and influence, 
America continues to innovate, improve and adapt as well.  Although China’s rise has 
certainly been impressive, America’s sustained international importance also deserves an 
appropriate level of acknowledgement. 
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6. Conclusion 
China’s increasing economic and military strength elevates its significance to the 
United States.  A stated desire for multipolarity, an alliance with Russia, a demonstrated 
tendency to balance against the strongest power, and a strategy of A2/AD all indicate that 
China seeks to challenge America’s security posture in Asia.  However, Beijing does not 
want and cannot afford a direct confrontation with the United States. 
Arguably the worst-case scenario for China would be an actual military conflict 
with the United States because of the negative impact on trade, its economy, regional 
relationships, and the price of the conflict itself.  The consequences for a comprehensive 
defeat in the Taiwan Strait are different for China than they are for the United States.  
The United States withstood a withdrawal from Vietnam, and President Clinton was even 
re-elected to a second term after withdrawing from Somalia.  Although a military defeat 
in the Straits would certainly be harmful to U.S. interests, it could be catastrophic for the 
PRC. 
The CCP is constantly concerned with social movements within its borders and 
understands that stability must be maintained in order to prevent massive social 
movements from challenging its authority.  Conflict with the United States would almost 
certainly interfere with China’s economic growth and degrade the state’s ability to secure 
and control its population.  While a military defeat would be embarrassing and costly for 
the United States, a defeat could lead to a challenge of authority for the CCP. 
An outright conflict would have a negative effect on both countries but would 
have far greater impacts on China from which the regime might not recover. If Beijing’s 
threat perception of America is driving PLA modernization efforts, then America’s 
actions and policies necessarily have a profound effect on shaping China’s defense 
strategy.  This gives America an incredible opportunity to influence the strategic 
development of both countries. The challenge for the United States is not how to best 
counter the marginal threat from the PLA, but rather how to capitalize on the inherent 
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